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Abstract  
 Epstein (1994; 2003) proposed that there are two cognitive 
information processing systems that operate in parallel: the intuitive thinking 
style and the rational thinking style. Decisional fit occurs when the preferred 
thinking style is applied to making a decision and research has shown that 
this fit increases the value of the outcome of a decision. Additionally, 
decisional fit leads to less regret, even when post hoc evaluations show the 
decision to be incorrect. It has not yet been determined whether decisional fit 
correlates with greater happiness and hence, the purpose of the current study 
was to investigate the difference between styles of thinking, styles of 
decision making and the impact of decisional fit on happiness scores. 
Individual differences in thinking and decision style were measured using an 
online interactive questionnaire (N = 100), and an ANOVA, hierarchical 
multiple regression, and a series of t-tests, were used to investigate the 
relationship between thinking style, decision style, decisional fit, and 
happiness, thereby addressing a gap in the existing literature. The major 
findings from the current study show that intuitive thinking has a strong 
positive correlation with happiness; that intuitive thinkers are more likely to 
utilize intuitive decisional style, than rational thinkers; and that when both 
rational and intuitive thinkers experienced decisional fit, higher ratings of 
happiness were reported. Explanations and recommendations for future 
studies are outlined in the discussion. 
 
Keywords: Intuitive thinking; rational thinking; decisional fit; decisional 
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Introduction 
  Happiness has been described as an optimal state of being; not 
merely a fleeting emotional state, but more a deep and abiding sense of 
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flourishing (Ricard, 2007). Happiness does not occur automatically with 
acquisition or fortuitous circumstance, but through personal construction 
requiring patience, effort, and time (Peterson, Park, & Seligman, 2005; Ryan 
& Deci, 2001; Seligman, Steen, Park, & Peterson, 2005). As the most 
common answer to what people want from life is to be happy, happiness is 
still a relatively unexplored domain of research (Lyubomirsky, Tkach, & 
Dimatteo, 2006; Helliwell, Layard, & Sachs, 2012). It may be that how 
individuals think, process information, and make decisions contributes to 
overall subjective happiness. Specifically, if there is an alignment between 
an individual’s dominant thinking style, either rational or intuitive, and this 
same thinking style is applied to making a choice, the congruence between 
thought and action may elevate subjective happiness ratings via the concept 
of regulatory fit (Betsch & Kunz, 2008; Higgins, 2005; Witterman, van den 
Berken, Claes, & Godoy, 2009). This aim of this paper is to explore the idea 
that differences in happiness ratings may occur in individuals as a 
consequence of decisional fit; a concept similar to person environment fit 
(Holland, 1997), but applied to thinking styles and decision making 
(Higgins, 2005). Betsch and Kunz (2008) found that when participants 
experienced decisional fit a higher perceived value was placed on the 
decision, and less regret was felt even if the decision was incorrect in 
hindsight (De Vries, Holland, & Witterman, 2008). What has not as yet been 
addressed in the previous literature is whether there is a correlation between 
decisional fit and happiness, as opposed to feelings of lower remorse 
associated with decisions made (De Vries et al., 2008; Diener, Fujita, Tay, & 
Biswas-Diener, 2012; Higgins, 2005). 
 
Happiness 
 Currently, there is no universally agreed upon definition for the 
subjective state of happiness and words like life satisfaction, contentment 
and wellbeing are often used interchangeably to describe the state of being 
happy (Ryan & Deci, 2001). For the purposes of the current study the 
definition of happiness shall be derived from the three-fold concept of global 
happiness proposed by Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi (2000) and defined 
as a combination of pleasure, flow, engagement and meaningful purpose  
(Lyubomirsky, Tkach, & Dimatteo, 2006; Seligman et al., 2005).  This 
global pathway to happiness minimises the heritability of personality 
attributes, and it has good cross cultural generalizability (Lyubomirsky, 
Tkach, & Dimatteo, 2006). In order to make the decision that one is happy, it 
must be evaluated cognitively (Kahneman, 1999). This means that in order to 
self-determine the answer, yes I am happy or no I am not happy a decision 
with regard to happiness must be made. There is however, a paucity of 
research as to whether happiness is determined rationally, where a list of 
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particular attributes, circumstances and qualities are considered, or 
determined intuitively, as a deep gut level reaction that is an integrated pool 
of personal retrospectives and emotional attributions of experience. It is 
entirely possible that the rational and intuitive systems have bidirectional 
interplay and that the combination of both systems answers the question of 
perceived happiness (Helliwell, Layard, & Sachs, 2012).  
 
Thinking styles 
 Cognitive Experiential Self Theory (CEST) is a model designed to 
measure two distinct cognitive information processing styles, a rational 
system and an intuitive system within the context of a global theory of 
personality (Epstein, 1994). CEST is a paradigm that incorporates the 
conceptual principles of learning theory, cognitive theory and self-theory 
(Pacini & Epstein, 1999). Epstein (1994, 2003) proposed that these two 
systems have different approaches to evaluating judgements, choices and for 
making decisions (Epstein & Meier, 1989; Kahneman, 2011). The rational 
system is the domain of new learning where information is encoded in 
numbers, words, symbols and concepts that allow for conscious reasoning 
and logical justification (Norris & Epstein, 2011). It is a conscious thought 
process which requires attention and effort to deliberate and problem solve 
information. Interacting, and operating in parallel, is a second system that is 
a fast, instinctual, emotionally driven cognitive aspect of self, known as the 
intuitive system (Kahneman, 2011; Norris & Epstein, 2011). The intuitive 
system is the domain of tacit and implicit knowledge, cognitive schemas, and 
emotional memory. It operates through heuristics, individual knowledge, 
memory, and interpretation of past and present events. This system 
conceptualizes possibility via imagination through which it provides 
expectations of the future (Sayegh, Anthony, & Perrewe, 2004). 
 Research has shown that individuals have a slight preference for one 
of these cognitive domains, either rational or intuitive, thereby favouring one 
thinking style over the other (Betsch, 2004; Kahneman, 2011). Even though 
individual’s have a preferred thinking style, when it comes to making 
decisions that preference or decisional style is not always applied to making 
a choice. In societies where learning is based upon memorization of facts and 
tests of competence are designed and measured on evidence based 
responding, children grow up classically conditioned to be able to justify a 
logical explanation for behaviour and thought (Norris & Epstein, 2011; 
Sladek, Bond, & Phillips, 2010). For example, when asked why a particular 
choice was made, answers that show sequential reasoned thought are 
respected in spite of individual differences between answers. However, 
responses that are more intuitive such as it just felt right to me or I do not 
know why I made that decision but it happened in hindsight to turn out ok, 
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are labelled flaky and inadequate as a justification for thought or behaviour 
as they do not follow the display rules of formal logic (De Vries, Holland, & 
Witterman, 2008; Sayegh, Anthony, & Perrewe, 2004; Sinclair & 
Ashkanasy, 2005). Society endorses choices made upon sound justifiable 
logic which is the domain of the rational mind, and in many situations there 
is a stigma associated with decisions made upon gut feeling or instinct, the 
domain of the intuitive mind (Sinclair & Ashkanasy, 2005). Some 
researchers go as far as to claim that emotionality should be forfeited or 
suppressed in order to make accurate respectable decisions (Damasio, 1994). 
It has however, been found that individuals who have a preference for 
intuitive thinking are more effective when dealing with tasks that are non-
decomposable, require insight and holistic judgements that are not hindered 
by the execution of sequentially ordered analytic reasoning (Dane, Rockman, 
& Pratt, 2012). In a study on management strategy on the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks of the World Trade Centre fast sound decisions had to be made in 
situations of high uncertainty, fear and with an absence of all facts (Bram, 
Orr, & Rapaport, 2002; Sayegh, Anthony, & Perrewe, 2004). Many heuristic 
intuitive decisions were made within the context situational constraints 
involving large numbers of people and organisational systems. The accuracy 
of these decisions in post hoc evaluation was found higher where there was 
experience and domain expertise, and although the preference for intuitive 
thinking itself does not change over the lifespan, tacit and implicit 
knowledge does (Dane, Rockman, & Pratt, 2012; Pacini & Epstein, 1999). 
Likewise, research into leaders, senior managers and CEO’s show that where 
there is high domain expertise and under time pressured crisis conditions, 
intuitive decision making is often used effectively where good judgements 
are largely dependent upon emotional signalling (Bechara, Damasio, & 
Damasio, 2000). Good judgements sometimes involve issues of morality and 
ethical virtue, which has been investigated with regard to thinking and 
decisional styles.  Zhong (2008) proposes that the rules of the rational mind 
can override the instinctual feeling that is associated with conscience, thus 
supporting the idea of intuitive decision making for sound moral judgements.  
This idea conflicts with research from Pacini & Epstein (1999) who found 
that higher conscientiousness and morality were associated with rational 
thinking and rational decisional processes. As morality is considered a key 
tenent associated with happiness as stated by various happiness philosophers 
(Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000) the current study seeks to understand 
whether there is a relationship between a particular thinking and decisional 
style with happiness, which may shed some light for future research on 
ethical decision making. 
 The main body of research shows that reasoned deliberated decision 
making, although generally condoned by society as the superior cognitive 
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style to intuitive decision making, it does not always fit with environmental 
contexts and situations of uncertainty. Individuals who show a preference for 
the rational thinking style are better suited to tasks requiring the evaluation 
of facts derived from time intensive analysis, evidence and proof (Epstein, 
2003; Kahneman, 2011). However, rational decision making has also been 
linked with procrastination, higher stress, anxiety and depression, where for 
some individuals the search for the most factual and logically correct answer 
can induce negative affective states (Buss, 2000; Leykin & DeRubeis, 2010). 
Conversely, intuitive thinking is positively correlated with high relationship 
satisfaction, popularity, creativity, imagination and empathy (Norris & 
Epstein, 2011), but on the darker side intuitive thinking is also related to 
impulsivity, superstitious beliefs and psychopathy (Freeman, Evans, & 
Lister, 2012). As some of the highest correlates to happiness are strong 
interpersonal relationships, popularity, (Diener & Seligman, 2002) as well as 
having the quality of faith  (Stark & Maier, 2008) it is posited that the current 
study would find a relationship between intuitive thinking and happiness.  
 
Decisional styles 
 Even though each individual shows a preference for a particular 
thinking style, the preferred thinking style is not always applied to making a 
decision. In fact, situations arise daily where the preferred thinking style is 
ignored in favour of actions and decisions made from the opposite cognitive 
domain (Kahneman, 2011; Zhong, 2008). For example, an individual with a 
preference for rational thinking might conclude that spending money on a 
luxury item is unwise based upon the financial facts presented in a bank 
statement. However, the intuitive mind might override these facts and the 
desired item may still be purchased, indicating an intuitive/emotional 
decisional style from a rational thinker. For those individuals who have a 
preference for intuitive thinking, and who are culturally and societally 
conditioned to apply rational logic to making a decision, less resultant 
satisfaction with the decision may occur as a result of cognitive conflict 
(Betsch & Kunz, 2008; Higgins, 2005; Witterman, van den Berken, Claes, & 
Godoy, 2009). That is, the decisional style or the action process 
demonstrated to make a decision is not congruent with the preferred thinking 
style. A decision can be made rationally or intuitively, and information will 
oscillate between the two systems until a choice is made (Betsch & Kunz, 
2008; Dane, Rockman, & Pratt, 2012). The cognitive domain where the 
action, behaviour and commitment to a choice is made, either the intuitive 
mind or the rational mind, is known as the decisional style (Pacini & Epstein, 
1999). This is the system that accepts a solution and commits to an 
actionable decision when faced with a choice, in that particular situation 
(Betsch & Kunz, 2008).    
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Decisional  fit 
 Research into fit theory suggests that when there is person-
environment fit, or a client-therapist fit, it is a robust predictor of well-being 
and personal satisfaction (Frank, 1971; Holland, 1997; Rogers, 2012; Walsh, 
Craik, & Price, 2000). The concept of decisional fit extends upon this 
theoretical underpinning showing that when one of two preferred thinking 
strategies, either a predominant rational thinking style or a preferred intuitive 
thinking style that is then applied to making a decision (decisional style), the 
individual would experience decisional fit (Betsch & Kunz, 2008; Higgins, 
2005; Walsh, Craik, & Price, 2000). That is, rational thinkers who make a 
decision rationally based upon facts, logic and reason, and intuitive thinkers 
who make a decision intuitively (based upon instinct, emotion or feeling) 
would experience decisional fit if the preferred thinking style is acted upon 
congruently when faced with a choice (Betsch & Kunz, 2008). By applying 
the concept of fit theory to decision making (decisional fit) it may increase 
subjective happiness ratings simply through alignment with congruent 
cognitive style. Regulatory fit increases the positive value and feeling of 
rightness of subjective evaluations (Betsch & Kunz, 2008; Higgins, 2005; 
Rogers, 2012). 
  What has not as yet been addressed in the previous literature is 
whether decisional fit actually increases subjective happiness ratings, as 
opposed to simply reducing disappointment, as well as providing a 
psychological damage control mechanism with regard to ill-fitting choices 
(Betsch & Kunz, 2008; Lyubomirsky, Tkach, & Dimatteo, 2006). Preferred 
decision making strategies become a routine or habitual way of responding 
over time. That is, a preferred style of decision making (either intuitive or 
rational) becomes a stable preference within the individual (Messick, 1976). 
If an individual naturally seeks decisional fit an elevation of positive value 
will be associated with the learned strategy (Betsch, 2004, 2008). However, 
decisional misfit can also become a learned strategy of responding to 
decision making and it may be associated with less perceived resultant 
satisfaction with making choices (Broder & Schiffer, 2006). It is proposed 
that the individuals who have a preferred intuitive thinking style, and who 
apply the intuitive decisional style to achieve decisional fit, would 
experience higher subjective ratings of happiness, when compared with 
individuals who have a preferred rational thinking style or those who 
experience decisional misfit. Decisional misfit occurs when the preferred 
thinking or decisional style is not used when making a decision (Betsch & 
Kunz, 2008; Higgins, 2005). That is, for example, when an intuitive thinker 
makes a decision rationally, or when a rational thinker makes a decision 
intuitively; this would be decisional misfit. The implications of finding a link 
between preference for intuitive thinking and happiness, via decisional fit 
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has practical utility with regard to understanding whether happiness is 
recognized, assessed, harnessed and processed differently between intuitive 
and rational thinkers (Epstein & Pacini, 2001; Ramirez, Millana, Toldos-
Romero, Bonniot-Cabanac, & Cabanac, 2009). If links are found between a 
particular thinking style, decisional style and decisional fit with regard to 
happiness ratings, this would provide insight into the value of being true to 
self (Raffaldi, Iannello, Vittani, & Antonietti, 2012). This could also provide 
some insight as to what kind of therapy would be suited to each of the 
different thinking styles. If rational thinkers who experience decisional fit, 
and if higher happiness is ascribed based upon logic and reason, then clearly 
articulated facts about reasons to change would be appropriate, as personal 
happiness levels would increase. If however, the same rational logic and 
reason for change was applied to an intuitive thinker, decisional misfit may 
occur thus reducing the potential chances for change. Hypothetically, if an 
intuitive thinker was presented with emotive or feeling based reasons for 
change, and decisional fit occurred, then the correlated subjective happiness 
would provide motivation based upon congruence of thought and feeling to 
inspire change in these circumstances, for this type of individual (Epstein & 
Pacini, 2001; Witterman et al., 2009). One of the intentions of this research 
is to uncover one possible reason for why some conventional therapeutic 
techniques are unsuccessful for some individuals, in spite of education and 
rehabilitation (Beck, 2011). The implications for finding a difference 
between the two groups may provide a deeper understanding towards 
motivation for personal decision strategies and personal choice behaviour, if 
happiness is a key driver associated with reward (Betsch & Kunz, 2008; 
Buss, 2000; Epstein , Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996; Leykin & 
DeRubeis, 2010; Watson & Tharp, 2013). 
 Based on this research, four hypotheses were formulated to 
investigate the relationship between the variables of preferred thinking 
styles, decisional style and decisional fit on the outcome variable of 
happiness. Specifically, they are as follows: 
 H1: It was hypothesized that participants who scored higher on the 
preference for intuition scale (intuitive thinkers) would report higher ratings 
of happiness than participants who scored higher on the preference for 
deliberation thinking scale (rational thinkers).  
 H2: It was hypothesized that intuitive thinkers would be more likely 
to make intuitive style decisions (cognitive congruence) and therefore score 
higher on the intuitive decisional style scale than rational thinkers.  
 H3: It was hypothesized that participants who scored higher on the 
intuitive decisional style scale would report higher scores of happiness than 
those participants who scored higher on the rational decisional scale.   
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 H4: It was also hypothesized that all participants who experienced 
decisional fit (either intuitive or rational decisional fit) would report higher 
happiness than the participants who experienced decisional misfit.  
 
Method 
Participants 
 Participants were psychology students from Bond University (n = 20) 
who participated in exchange for course credit. Additionally, an email 
invitation with a link to the online Google forms survey was sent to extended 
contacts known to the researcher, which continued to be forwarded by the 
recipients known as a chain sampling method (n = 80). The final sample was 
N = 100, females (80%), males (20%) ranging in age 18 and 74 years (M = 
48.53, SD = 16.82). Of these participants 40% were partnered, and 60% were 
not partnered, or single. Highest level of education was categorized into 
tertiary and above 56% and high school/TAFE/trade (including any 
education but not at tertiary level) 44%. The predominant ethnicity was 
Australian, 67% followed by European 18%, American/Canadian 10% and 
Asian 5%.   
 There was no anticipated problem with this recruitment method as 
research from Tat et al. (2010) found that there were no differences between 
thinking styles or decision making styles based upon age, race, gender, or 
years of occupational experience. To control for possible confounds with 
decisional style and self-reported happiness, criterion exclusion was 
implemented prior to the demographic questions (Pacini & Epstein, 1999). 
Variables that may impact both decisional style and self-reported happiness 
ratings would be the consumption of mind altering drugs and alcohol within 
the previous eight hours, as well as anti-psychotic medications (Leykin & 
DeRubeis, 2010). For this reason participants who had consumed alcohol or 
recreational drugs within eight hours, or participants who required 
antipsychotic medications were asked to refrain from participation in order to 
preserve the integrity of the data. This exclusion criterion was designed to 
increase the internal validity of the study but it would also limit the 
generalizability of the results. 
 
Procedure and materials 
Thinking style assessment 
 Participants were asked to complete the self-report 18-item 
Preference for Intuition and Deliberation scale (PID; Betsch, 2004) designed 
to measure the individual preference for intuitive thinking (PID-I) and the 
preference for deliberation (PID-D). The preference for deliberation scale is 
synonymous with the term rational thinking style. The PID inventory has 
robust psychometric properties with the internal reliability for PID-I ranging 
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between Cronbach’s alpha .76 - .81, and for the PID-D ranging between .76 - 
.79. Discriminant validity was less than r = -.20 indicating a sound negative 
correlation between the measures.  The PID scale was used as it measures the 
preferred thinking system (intuitive or deliberate) without capturing 
personality attributes or intellectual ability (Betsch, 2004). The six month 
test-re-test reliability was PID-I alpha = .76, PID-D alpha = .74 indicating 
good stability over time. 
 There were nine items from each of the PID-I and PID-D scales. All 
questions were answered on a 5-point scale from (1) strongly disagree to (5) 
strongly agree. An example question from the PID-I domain was “my 
feelings play an important role in my decisions” and from the PID-D domain 
“before making decisions, I first think them through.” The items from each 
subscale were summed (range = 9 – 45) and higher scores from one measure 
(PID-I or PID-D) when compared with the other (PID-I or PID-D) indicated 
the preferred individual thinking style. Research from Raffaldi et al. (2012) 
shows that the decision making style that follows from the use of the self-
report method of the PID scale is consistent and congruent with the actual 
methodology employed by participants in real life situations.  
 
Decisional style assessment 
 The decisional style measure is to ascertain which cognitive process, 
either rational or intuitive, is actually used to make a decision irrespective of 
preferred thinking style. For example, an individual may show a preference 
for intuitive thinking naturally, as measured on the PID scale. However, 
when faced with a choice, a decision may not actually be made using the 
intuitive mind, but be made rationally. To measure decisional style, a new 
online interactive survey was formulated. This online questionnaire was 
conceived of and conceptually adapted from laboratory experiments 
conducted by several decisional style researchers (Betsch & Kunz 2008; 
Horstmann, Hausmann, & Ryf, 2010; Witterman, van den Berken, Claes, & 
Godoy, 2009; Wang, 2000) in which both intuitive and rational decisional 
styles of participants were ascertained. 
 According to decision making theory, the recall of visual images 
would elicit an intuitive response when the decision is forced to be fast, has 
low task relevance, poses no immediate threat, and does not involve 
mathematical computations or language recall (Hedge, 2011; Horstmann et 
al., 2010; Kahneman, 2011). As there is no right or wrong answer to 
indicating a preference between two non-threatening stimuli, (e.g., a choice 
between two peaceful landscapes) it is less likely to activate deliberated 
rational contemplation and the impression would be assessed by the intuitive 
mind.  
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 Initially, participants were primed with the phrase “you will have five 
seconds to look at the following two images, before they fade. Then you will 
be required to answer a question.” By stating a five second time frame, alert 
focus and concentration would be induced by the intuitive system 
(Horstmann et al., 2010).  This was repeated with a reminder phrase “you 
will have five seconds to look at the following images”. A matched pair of 
generic images (for example two different landscapes) was presented, for a 
total of five seconds before they faded. After the picture faded, participants 
were required to answer the intuitively primed section of the questionnaire 
please answer the following question based on your initial impression only. 
Please try not to think about your answer. Which do you prefer ‘picture 1’ or 
‘picture 2’. Respondents were required to quickly commit to a choice, by 
nominating a preference before continuing. 
 To induce and prime the rational mind participants were then asked 
to recall from memory the images and think about the qualities of each 
(inducing rational thought) and nominate a preference based upon either 
personal functional utility (rational; I think this would serve my needs 
better), or desire based preference (intuitive; I just like it more; it appeals to 
me; non-rational or emotive).  This set of questions was primed with the 
statement now, based upon your choice please think carefully about which 
answer would best describe your thought process now. The words please 
think carefully are registered by the rational mind as rules, and the rational 
system must be engaged in order to comprehend this task (Horstmann et al., 
2010). 
 The rational section permitted the respondent unlimited time before 
committing to an answer. A forced choice answer example was I think this 
would be a better holiday destination for me indicating a deliberated rational 
decision style or I just like this one more, indicating an emotive, subjective, 
intuitive decision style. This set of forced choice questions was to garner 
decisional style; that is to measure whether a decision was made rationally or 
intuitively.  The rational thought and intuitive feeling based questions were 
counterbalanced throughout the questionnaire to prevent automaticity with 
responding (Mitchell & Jolley, 2007).  
 There were another nine questions (ten in total) that comprised this 
section. The format remained the same, but different sets of pictures were 
used, and the wording was changed slightly to match the picture content. 
Examples of the matched pair items included images of scenery, food, 
musical instruments, young animals, beverages and flowers. 
 To calculate which decisional style was used, each intuitive 
decisional style response was allocated 1 point, where rational decisional 
style was allocated zero. Each participant’s scores were summed and 
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respondent’s scores that were higher than 5 out of 10 were allocated to the 
intuitive decisional style group. 
 
Determining decisional fit 
 Decisional fit was defined as congruence between thinking style and 
decisional style (Higgins, 2005). This means that if participant’s scores on 
the PID scale revealed a higher intuitive thinking style, and this emotive 
thinking style was used to make a decision then that response qualified as a 
decisional fit. The same logic was applied to rational thinking responses. 
Where participants did not use the preferred thinking style and apply it to 
making a choice, it was categorized as decisional misfit (De Vries et al., 
2008). For each of the ten questionnaire items, participants were classified as 
either having decisional fit (intuitive thinking plus intuitive decision making, 
or rational thinking plus rational decision making) or having decisional 
misfit (preferred thinking style and an incongruent decision style). A total 
score for the ten items was calculated whereby a score of ten meant 
decisional fit for all ten items and a score of zero meant no decisional fit for 
all ten items.  This variable was subsequently split into high decisional fit 
(scores above 6) and low decisional fit (scores below 6). 
 
Happiness 
 The subjective happiness scale (SHS; Lyubomirsky & Lepper, 1999) 
was used to measure individual self-reported subjective happiness. This is a 
robust measure for global subjective happiness, even though it only has four 
items, and Lyubomirsky et al. (2006) have found that individuals are able to 
accurately rate their own happiness.  The internal consistency coefficients for 
the 4-item subjective happiness scale have ranged from alpha = .79 - .94 (M 
= .86), and both test-retest reliability and convergent validity coefficients 
averaged r = .72. An example question was “some people are generally very 
happy. They enjoy life regardless of what is going on, getting the most out of 
everything. To what extent does this characterization describe you?” to be 
answered on a 7-point scale from (1) not at all to (7) a great deal. To score 
each of the items are summed and averaged (with question four reverse 
scored) to provide a final score of between one and seven. Scores above 3.5 
indicated higher subjective happiness. 
 
Detection of Impression Management  
 The short 13-item forced choice (true/false) Social Desirability Scale 
(SDS, Short Form C: Crowne & Marlowe, 1960; Fischer & Fick, 1993). This 
measure is a recommended inclusion for all self-report surveys to detect 
impression management (Reynolds & Livingston, 2012). The internal 
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consistency for the SDS short form C shows Cronbach’s alpha ranging from 
.76 - .88, and the test-retest coefficient is r = .89 (Fischer & Fick, 1993).  
 
Results 
 As the participants were sampled from two different sources (Bond 
University students and the general public) a Multivariate Analysis of 
Variance (MANOVA) was performed on the dependant variables of the 
study, to ensure that the two groups were not significantly different from 
each other. Results showed that the two samples were fit to be merged in one 
dataset and were treated as a unified whole set, as the MANOVA yielded a 
non-significant outcome on the combined variables, F (3, 103) = 0.41, p = 
.750. Two participants were removed from the data set for not adhering to 
the exclusion criteria requests and five participants scoring highly on the 
Marlow- Crowne SDS were also removed. The Statistical Package for Social 
Sciences (SPSS) version 22 was used to conduct all analyses and all analyses 
were read at an alpha level of .05, unless otherwise specified. 
 
Preference for intuitive or rational thinking styles 
 In order to test preference for intuition and preference for rational 
thinking, scores on the PID were summed and participants were assigned to 
groups based on their scores on PID-I and PID-D (intuitive thinker or 
rational thinker). Participants who scored higher on PID-I were assigned to 
the preference for intuitive thinking category, and respondents who scored 
higher on PID-D were assigned to the preference for rational thinking 
category. Participants who had the exact same score on both PID-I and PID-
D or, who only had one point difference between the two categories, were 
excluded from this part of the analysis due to the more balanced dual nature 
of thinking style. The final sample size was (n = 84).  Chi-square analysis 
revealed that there were more individuals who qualified as rational thinkers 
(n = 63) when compared to individuals who qualified as intuitive thinkers (n 
= 21), x2 (1) = 21.00, p <.001. 
 
Preference for intuitive or rational decision making style 
 Based on the scores on the decisional style, participants were 
assigned to two groups: individuals favouring rational decision making or 
individuals favouring intuitive decision making. A median split was 
performed to create these categories. Results of the chi-square analyses 
showed that the number of individuals favouring rational decision making (n 
= 44) was not significantly different from the number of individuals 
favouring intuitive decision making (n = 40), x2 (1) = 0.19, p = .663. The 
unequal group sizes found in the chi-square analyses above means that some 
caution is advised with the interpretation of results. Additionally, conducting 
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a median split can present the risk of a Type II error, as participants with 
close scores are allocated to different groups and then compared to each 
other (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2014).  
An initial Pearson’s correlation analysis was conducted to examine 
relationships between the key variables used in subsequent hypothesis testing 
(Table 1). 
Table 1 Pearson’s Correlation Summary Table, with Means and Standard Deviations for 
Rational and Intuitive Thinking, Social Desirability, Happiness and Decision Style 
Scale 1 2 3 4 5 6 M SD 
1.PID-D -      35.05 5.06 
2.PID-I .16 -     31.36 4.38 
3.SDS -.02 .06 -    7.26 2.83 
4.Happiness .11 .38** .27* -   21.95 4.14 
5.Decision style -.23* .29* .04 -.05 -  14.44 2.30 
Note. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. PID-D = Rational thinking, PID-I = Intuitive 
thinking, SDS = Social Desirability Scale. 
 
 A number of significant correlations were found. There was a 
positive relationship between Happiness and PID-I showing that higher 
intuitive decision making was associated with higher happiness scores. 
Higher happiness scores were also associated with higher scores on the SDS 
scale, thereby justifying the inclusion of SDS at step 1 of the regression to 
control for its impact. Consistent with expectations, there was no significant 
relationship between happiness and PID-D, indicating that unlike intuitive 
thinkers, rational thinkers were not more likely to be happier. There was a 
significant positive correlation between intuitive thinking and intuitive 
decision style and a negative correlation between rational thinking and 
intuitive decision style. These correlations showed that intuitive thinkers 
were more likely to make intuitive decisions and rational thinkers were more 
likely to make a rational decision, which provides initial support for 
decisional fit theory (Betsch & Kunz, 2008).  
 
Correlations to happiness 
 A hierarchical regression was performed in order to assess the 
contribution of the predictor variables, rational thinking and intuitive 
thinking, on the criterion variable happiness, after controlling for social 
desirability.  
The overall model with all predictors entered was significant, F(4, 
79) = 5.48, p < .001 and this accounted for 22% of variance in happiness 
scores. Regression coefficients are shown in Table 2.      
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Table 2 Hierarchical Regression Coefficients for Social Desirability, Rational and Intuitive 
Thinking as Predictors of Happiness 
 Predictors R ∆R2 B SEB β CI (B) 
Step 1  .27 .07     
 Constant   19.11*** 1.21   
 SDS   .33 .16 .27 [.08, .70] 
Step 2  .47** .15     
 Constant   2.82 6.31   
 PID-D   .04 .08 .05 [-.13, .20] 
 PID-I   .34 .10 .36*** [.15, .53] 
Note. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. SDS = Social Desirability Scale, PID-D = Rational 
thinking, PID-I = Intuitive thinking. CI (B) = 95% Confidence Interval 
  
 At step one, social desirability was a significant predictor of 
happiness, F(1, 82) = 6.37, p = .014 and this explained 7.2% of variance. 
Individuals who responded in a socially desirable manner scored higher on 
the happiness scale. At step two, the addition of the predictor variables 
(rational thinking and intuitive thinking) significantly contributed an 
additional 14.5% variance in happiness scores ∆ F (3, 79) = 4.88, p = .004.  
Intuitive thinking appeared as the strongest predictor of happiness. Close 
inspection of the beta weights revealed that as scores on the preference for 
intuitive thinking increased so did happiness scores (β = .36, p < .001). The 
beta weights also showed that rational thinking did not contribute significant 
unique variance in predicting happiness. The finding from this study shows 
that intuitive thinking is correlated with higher happiness than rational 
thinking thus supporting the first hypothesis. These results contribute to the 
research from De Vries et al. (2008) that found that happier people were 
more likely to base decisions upon intuitive decisional style as these 
individuals were more comfortable trusting their feelings than rational 
decision makers.  
 
Thinking style and decisional style 
 The current study sought to investigate whether participants 
categorised as intuitive thinkers would score higher on the intuitive 
decisional style scale than participants categorised as rational thinkers, 
thereby confirming a predominant use of an intuitive style of decision 
making, when compared to participants categorised as rational thinkers. An 
independent samples t-test was performed comparing intuitive thinkers (n = 
21) and rational thinkers (n = 63) on the dependent variable, intuitive 
decisional style. The results confirmed this hypothesis. Intuitive thinkers (M 
=16.76, SD = 2.68), t (82) = -2.89, p =.005 scored significantly higher on the 
intuitive decisional style scale compared to rational thinkers (M = 15.16, SD 
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= 2.03). Effect size as measured by Cohen’s d was 0.67, which indicated a 
medium to large effect size (Cohen, 1988).  
 The results of this finding show that intuitive thinking was related to 
more intuitively based decision making. This finding is congruent with 
previous research that shows that the commitment from intuitive thinkers to 
make an intuitively based decision is stronger and faster than those people 
who prefer rational thinking styles, who apply rational decisional style 
(Kahneman, 2011; Pacini & Epstein, 1999). 
 
Decisional styles and happiness 
 It was also of interest to determine whether individuals who made 
intuitive decisions would be significantly different on their subjective reports 
of happiness when compared to individuals who made rational decisions. To 
test this hypothesis, an Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was computed using 
the independent variable of decisional style (rational; n = 44, intuitive; n = 
40) on the dependent variable, happiness. All ANOVA assumptions were 
met, prior to conducting the analysis. The results showed a non-significant 
difference on the combined variables, F (2, 81) = 2.04, p 
= .136, ηp2 = .05 with a small effect size.  These results do not support 
hypothesis three, such that intuitive decisional style alone did not impact 
subjective ratings of happiness. Therefore, simply making an emotively 
influenced decision without considering the preferred thinking style does not 
correlate with higher happiness. This finding supports decisional fit theory 
that shows that only when there is congruence between preferred thinking 
style applied to choice, that higher evaluative satisfaction is perceived 
(Betsch, 2004; Higgins, 2005). This means that not all impulsive decisions 
are considered favourably by the individual making the decision. Thus, 
happiness is not a random occurrence that is automatically associated with 
intuitive decisional style. 
 
Decisional fit and happiness 
 The current study aimed to investigate whether participants’ 
decisional fit would influence happiness scores. An independent samples t-
test was performed comparing a high decisional fit group (n = 24) and a low 
decisional fit group (n = 60) on the dependent variable happiness. The 
assumption of normality was met, however homogeneity of variance was not 
met F = 5.18, p = .025, so an unequal variance estimate was used. The high 
decisional fit group (M = 23.63, SD = 2.60), t (70.68) = -2.41, p =.004 had 
significantly higher happiness scores compared to the low decisional fit 
group (M = 21.28, SD = 4.45), thereby supporting the fourth hypothesis. 
Effect size as measured by Cohen’s d was 0.64, which indicated a medium 
effect size (Cohen, 1988). 
European Scientific Journal April 2016 edition vol.12, No.11  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
478 
 This finding suggests that when there is decisional fit individuals 
report higher happiness than when there is decisional misfit which is in 
alignment with previous research (Betsch & Kunz, 2008; Higgins, 2005). 
Regardless as to whether the preferred thinking style is rational or intuitive; 
making decisions that are congruent with personal preference indicates 
higher happiness potential. 
 
Conclusion 
 The current study shows that intuitive thinking and decisional fit are 
related to higher happiness and possible implications from this finding are 
discussed. Behavioural learning comes from the feelings associated with 
reinforcement of behaviour, and it is posited that the development of a 
preferred thinking style occurs the same way, as heritability does not 
completely account for the predisposition to a particular thinking style, (De 
Vries et al., 2008; Diener et al., 2012; Pacini & Epstein, 1999). If acting on 
decisional fit is also reinforced through an association with happiness, then 
the desire for congruence between the cognitive style and the synonomous 
action is also likely to increase over the lifespan (Messick, 1976). Intuitive 
decision makers are more likely to trust gut instinct based upon the belief 
that a sound decision is dependent upon emotional feedback (Sayegh et al., 
2004). Research from Kahneman (2011) has shown that intuitive decision 
style can lead to an incorrect decision as it is a fast cognitive heuristic that 
sometimes overrides the explicit knowledge of the rational mind. Rational 
thinking style leads to higher self-regulatory behaviour, where stress 
reactivity is associated with avoiding the negative consequences of incorrect 
decisions. Thus rational decision makers take longer to make a decision in 
order to be accurate, and are less likely to commit to an intuitively based 
decision (Leykin & DeRubeis, 2010). Given that approximately one third of 
the population show a preference for intuitive thinking, (one third are 
rational and one third are mixed) and society endorses and favours decisions 
that are logically sound, the rational style of decision making would induce 
decisional misfit for intuitive thinkers, and correlate with a reduction in 
subjective happiness appraisal (Betsch & Kunz, 2008; Leykin & DeRubeis, 
2010; Sinclair & Ashkanasy, 2005).  
 One of the strengths of the current study was that the decisional style 
measure was successfully translated from laboratory testing of participants 
(Betsch & Kunz, 2008) to an online questionnaire, which provided a 
practical, cost effective and time efficient instrument. This self-report 
measure employed the principles demonstrated by previous research of 
primed intuitive and rational decisional style responses from participants by 
inserting small fade videos that elicited time contingent responding, thereby 
eliminating the need for participant-researcher interaction. This allowed 
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participants to respond to the survey without the perceived pressure of 
compliance or altered performance (Hawthorne effects) that is usually 
associated with laboratory experimental conditions. The intention was to 
increase the accuracy of responding by participants and reduce researcher 
expectancy bias effects (Mitchell & Jolley, 2007). However, until processes 
beyond the scope of the current study are developed such as establishing 
internal reliability, convergent and discriminant validity, all results must be 
interpreted with caution. Also the generalizability of this study was reduced 
due to a restricted sample size and the demographic exclusion criterion 
involving mind altering substances. As this was a pilot study and much 
useful data was obtained, these limitations could be addressed in future 
studies. 
 The results from the current study show that there is no effect of 
happiness through a particular thinking style or decisional style alone 
without decisional fit, and fit theory suggests a consequent increase in 
affective attribution (Higgins, 2005; Lyubomirsky et al., 2006; Walsh, Craik, 
& Price, 2000). If the cognitive display rules for particular behaviours are 
followed by positive affectivity, then these behaviours are likely to be 
repeated (Beck, 2011; Messick, 1976). If negative behaviours are associated 
with pleasant feelings, then the decision to repeat the thinking style and 
action that led to the happiness is likely to reoccur (Cambria et al., 2012). 
Thus, the link between intuitive decision makers and higher happiness may 
also provide insight into maladaptive behaviours as well (Epstein & Pacini, 
2001). The impulsiveness associated with intuitive thinking, which correlates 
to higher happiness, may not always be based upon the moral rules condoned 
by society, however the individual will feel good, which could relate to a 
maladaptive association with happiness (Ramirez et al., 2009). This present 
study’s findings make a practical contribution towards understanding a 
relationship where the decisions and behaviours that feel good are not always 
appropriate, which could have a practical utility in areas such as the 
maintaining of addictions, schadenfreude and criminal reoffending (Ramirez 
et al., 2009). Thus, for intuitive thinkers and intuitive decision makers, 
rational education to counter negative behaviour may not always prove 
effective, if happy feelings override logic (Beck, 2011). Emotion focused 
therapies may be a more prudent strategy for intuitive thinkers, in order to 
change maladaptive behaviours, and to reassociate happiness with virtuous 
morality based personal strengths, leading to positive meaning making, and 
adaptive happiness (Higgins, 2005; Greenberg, 2004; Seligman, Steen, Park, 
& Peterson, 2005).  
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